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Abstract
This paper deals with questions of the politics of location in knowledge and 
norm production within the context of Egyptian feminist activism for abandon-
ing female genital cutting practices. It seeks to determine underlying schemes 
of international campaigning discourse and analyzes how these predicate and 
complicate Egyptian postcolonial activism. It draws on a broad literature study 
in addition to fieldwork in Cairo consisting of in-depth interviews with activ-
ists and policy makers. My focus is on the national Task Force against FGM 
from 1994 until 1999 and its subsequent cooptation by the National Council of 
Childhood and Motherhood. I argue through the concept of catachresis that 
location matters in setting the terms of anti-FGC discourse and its relation to 
religion.
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Introduction
My aim in this article is to look at the epistemological-ontological nexus of 
assumptions underlying the global anti-FGM/C campaign. I argue that postcolo-
nial theory and the concept of catachresis offer valuable insights for understand-
ing the importance of location in knowledge production and the subsequent 
complex positioning of local, Egyptian activists and feminists who work for soci-
etal change and abandonment of the practice. My focus is on the intricacies of 
Egyptian activism against FGC and the interplay of global and local dynamics. 
The article shows how activists have to manoeuvre to carve out their own space 
within the context of Western-scripted international anti-FGC discourse and an 
authoritarian state.
This analysis builds on postcolonial theorist Gayatri Spivak’s conceptualiza-
tions of the notion of ‘catachresis’ to argue that it is crucial to look at particular 
historical-spatial frames of knowledge production and global consensus build-
ing in order to understand the complexities of local, Egyptian, activism. The 
first part of the paper surveys literature in order to examine the conditions that 
have enabled and created the sentiments and discourses that seek to turn the 
eradication of the practice of FGC into a global norm. In the second part I draw 
from my fieldwork in Cairo in order to discuss the nature of Egyptian activism 
protesting against the practice. My focus is on the 1990s national ‘Task Force 
against FGM’, its disbandment and the subsequent cooptation of the cause of 
fighting FGC by the National Council of Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM). 
I argue that Western-scripted hegemonic discourse production on the practice 
of FGC has both enabled the work of Egyptian activists and at the same time 
complicated and limited their activities and position towards the state and soci-
ety.
Anti-FGM Discourse and its Critiques
Questions of power relations and historical-spatial frames of knowledge pro-
duction underlie the following discussion of Egyptian anti-FGC activism. These 
questions are also central in Spivak’s conceptualization of catachresis that I will 
build on. In her article ‘Translation as culture’, Spivak uses the concept of cata-
chresis to refer to the process of creating new meaning by slightly deviating 
from the original meaning.1 This manner of proceeding is, importantly, a neces-
sary process. The only way to denounce the new meaning is by deflecting the 
hegemonic meaning into an alternate, subaltern, meaning. In an earlier piece, 
‘Poststructuralism, Marginality, Postcoloniality and Value’, however, catachresis 
is presented as a particular post-colonial strategy grounded in political-cultural 
history.2 Here it refers to the making of political claims that rely on, but which 
also deliberately misuse or abuse concepts and language resulting from the 
colonial encounter. Spivak argues that:
1 G.C. Spivak, ‘Translation as Culture’ in Parallax 6:1 (2000), 13–24.
2 G.C. Spivak, ‘Poststructuralism, Marginality, Postcoloniality and Value’ in P. Collier and 
H. Geyer-Ryan (eds.), Literary Theory Today, London: Polity Press 1990, 219–244.
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whatever the identitarian ethnicist claims of native or fundamental origin…the 
political claims that are most urgent in decolonized space are tacitly recognized 
as coded within the legacy of imperialism: nationhood, constitutionality, citizen-
ship, democracy, even culturalism….They’re being reclaimed, indeed claimed, as a 
concept-metaphor for which no historically adequate referent may be advanced 
from postcolonial space, yet that does not make the claims less important. A con-
cept-metaphor without an adequate referent is a catachresis.3
The assertion here is that these claims are encoded within an imperialist legacy 
as the historical specific script in which they are expressed, regardless of whether 
these concepts resonate globally and express universally desired goods. In what 
follows the article discusses the claim to abandon the cultural practice of FGC 
within a postcolonial, Egyptian context as a catachrestic claim. Female genital 
cutting practices are deeply rooted cultural practices in parts of Africa and are 
also present in parts of the Middle East and Asia. African feminists and activists 
who wish to change and abandon this practice find themselves confronted with 
few ‘adequate referents’ to support and legitimate an abrogation of this prac-
tice and the cultural-symbolic order that it represents. They usually resort to a 
hegemonic narrative of anti-FGC campaigning that has historically been written 
in a Western script of modernization, civilization and liberal individualism. The 
question is raised what it may mean for certain Egyptian activists to rely on and 
be dependent on Western-scripted anti-FGC discourse. I focus on their personal 
negotiation and the limits they encounter within aid-structures to illustrate 
how catachrestic claims are being made. It is argued that these claims are cata-
chrestic because they are inevitably embedded in western hegemonic anti-FGC 
discourse whilst nonetheless appropriating, moderating, and transforming cer-
tain aspects of this discourse in the service of local activism. The first part of this 
paper considers what it means to speak of a politics of location in knowledge 
production within the context of the global norm of fighting against female 
genital cutting practices. It begins with a genealogical outline of the epistemo-
logical foundations of anti-FGC discourse that succeeded in turning the ‘fight 
against FGC’ into a global and normative discourse. This brief overview sketches 
the particular contexts in which the practice has been debated, problematized 
and raised as a global point of action. Two distinct periods stand out: the early 
20th century when the British colonial administration first initiated efforts to 
criminalize the practice and secondly, the second-wave feminist condemnation 
of the practice from the late 1970s onwards. Both episodes exhibit understand-
ings of female genital cutting as backward and harmful and these critiques 
form the background against which the consensus-building processes of United 
Nations institutions have been led, resulting in an internationalist condemna-
tion of the practice as a violation against women and children’s rights.
Colonial Discourse, Feminism, and Female Genital Cutting Practices
Western interest in campaigning against the practice of female genital cutting 
first emerged during British colonization and the arrival of Christian missions 
in Africa. The British colonial administrations in Sudan and Kenya developed 
3 Ibid., 225.
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policies and legislation to reduce or eliminate what they saw as barbarous 
and backward customs.4 This concern was part of a larger preoccupation with 
women, their bodies and health, child rearing and children’s upbringing. A 
major reason for trying to change the practice of FGC and infibulation in Sudan 
in the 1920s was the colonial administration’s concern for the consequences 
of the practice on women’s fertility. Janice Boddy argues that colonial efforts 
against the practice are best understood within a wider population policy. Wor-
ried about declining population growth rates, the British aimed at eliminat-
ing infibulation and modernizing midwifery training in order to assure human 
reproduction and to increase the Empire’s production in the world market.5 
Policing and controlling women’s bodies and reproductive capacities took a cen-
tral position in a larger endeavour to control culture and society at large.
In colonial Sudan the subject of FGC became most heavily politicized after the 
introduction of legislation banning the practice in 1946. Mahmoud Mohammed 
Taha, the renowned Sudanese Islamic reformist, led the Rufa’a revolt against 
the British in defiance of the new law banning the practice.6 Thomas, Njambi 
and Pedersen present a similar politicization of the issue in various episodes of 
Kenyan colonial and postcolonial history.7 Also in Kenya the rejection of the 
practice by Christian missions and British officials brought about fierce resis-
tance by Kenyan women and nationalist leaders. The missionaries’ aversion of 
the practice in combination with the general societal destabilizing effects of col-
onization even reinforced the practice and gave it new meaning. Remarkably, 
women played an important role in both the Kenyan and Sudanese ‘female cir-
cumcision crises’. The wives of British officials, English female parliamentarians 
and feminist and humanitarian groups all became involved in rallying support 
for the eradication of the practice.8
Colonial attempts were largely ineffective in reversing the practice and most 
of these efforts were abandoned during the 1950s. For about twenty years, FGC 
would not receive major attention in the West. It was against the backdrop of 
second wave feminism and the United Nations ‘Decade of Women’ (1975–1985) 
4 J. Boddy, ‘Barbaric Custom and Colonial Science’ in The Ahfad Journal 23:2 (2006), 
81–106; J. Boddy, Civilizing Women: British Crusades in Colonial Sudan, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 2007; W.N. Njambi, ‘Irua Ria Atumia and Anti-Colonial Struggles 
Among the Gikuyu of Kenya: A Counter Narrative on “Female Genital Mutilation”’ in 
Critical Sociology 33:4 (2007), 689–708; L. Thomas, ‘Ngaitana (I Will Circumcise Myself): 
Lessons from Colonial Campaign to Ban Excision in Meru, Kenya’ in B. Shell-Duncan 
and Y. Herlund (eds.), Female Circumcision in Africa: Culture, Controversy and Change, 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2000, 129–150; L. Thomas, ‘‘The Politics of the Womb’: 
Kenyan Debates over the Affiliation Act’ in Africa Today 47:3/4 (2000), 153.
5 Boddy, ‘Barbaric Custom and Colonial Science’, 84.
6 A.A. Ibrahim, ‘‘Keep These Women Quiet’: Colonial Modernity, Nationalism, and the 
Female Barbarous Custom’ in Hawwa: Journal of Women of the Middle East and the 
Islamic World 9:1/2 (2011), 97–151.
7 Thomas, ‘Ngaitana (I Will Circumcise Myself)’; Thomas, ‘The Politics of the Womb’; 
Njambi, ‘Irua Ria Atumia and Anti-Colonial Struggles Among the Gikuyu of Kenya’; 
S. Pedersen, ‘National Bodies, Unspeakable Acts: The Sexual Politics of Colonial Policy-
making’ in The Journal of Modern History 63:4 (1991), 647–680.
8 Thomas, ‘Ngaitana (I Will Circumcise Myself)’, 132; Pedersen, ‘National Bodies, 
Unspeakable Acts’, 654–660.
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that the practice of female genital cutting received worldwide attention again. 
It is well known in feminist circles how North-American feminists Fran Hosken 
and Mary Daly raised the issue of FGC as part of their view on the global patri-
archal control over women. Their accounts have often served as examples of the 
perpetuation of a colonial feminism that victimizes, generalizes and homog-
enizes ‘Third-World women’.9 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, for example, has 
criticized Hosken and Daly for discursively creating the category of ‘backward 
third-world woman’ through their accounts of FGC and FGC-practicing cultures.
Anthropologist Janice Boddy, who has conducted many years of fieldwork in 
Sudan, points out how the focus has shifted.10 She argues that ‘while in the late 
19th and 20th centuries, women’s essence was associated with childbearing and 
the womb; from the mid-20th century on…it has come to focus on the clitoris 
as a site of sexual pleasure, signifying the unencumbered individual relative to 
the world.’11 Popular and political discourses informing anti-FGC campaigns saw 
a similar shift in focus. In the colonial period, infibulation and its consequences 
for childbirth were targeted while starting from the 1970s emphasis was placed 
on clitoridectomy and its consequences for sexual fulfilment. Attention on the 
womb had shifted to a focus on the vagina and the clitoris. Cultural changes 
and different perceptions of bodily experience in the West became reflected in 
both astonishment at and repugnance for the practice of FGC.
Despite a shift in focus, however, anti-FGC discourse as it developed in the 
1970s bore a resemblance to colonial attitudes.12 Gosselin discusses how colonial 
discursive practices against FGC were re-invoked by feminist writers and cam-
paigners despite their good intentions.13 The practice was mostly presented in an 
historical and decontextualized manner. Particular meanings, beliefs and values 
associated with the varied genital operations were dismissed as ‘tradition’ and 
thus easily ‘equated with “ignorance”, “superstition” – and one is tempted to 
read “backwardness”’.14 Gosselin and Kirby note how the significance of culture 
has been cast aside or at best very naïvely understood by feminists. Gosselin 
describes this process as ‘the trivialization of culture in the political literature’, 
in an effort to ban the practice.15 The use of dichotomies such as ‘barbaric’ vs. 
9 F.P. Hosken, The Hosken Report, Genital and Sexual Mutilation of Females, 4th rev. 
ed., Lexington: Women’s International Network News 1993; M. Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The 
Metaethics of Radical Feminism, Boston, MA: Beacon Press 1987; C.T. Mohanty, Feminism 
without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity, Durham and London: Duke 
University 2003; U. Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Third World Feminism and the Politics 
of Knowledge, Routledge: London and New York 1997.
10 J. Boddy, ‘Gender Crusades: the Female Circumcision Controversy in Cultural Perspective’ 
in Y. Hernlund and B. Shell-Duncan (eds.), Transcultural Bodies: Female Genital Cutting in 
Global Context, Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press 2007, 47.
11 Ibid., 56.
12 Boddy, ‘Gender Crusades’; C. Gosselin, ‘Feminism, Anthropology and the Politics of 
Excision in Mali: Global and Local Debates in a Postcolonial World’ in Anthropologica 
42:1 (2000), 43–60; V. Kirby, ‘On the Cutting Edge: Feminism and Clitoridectomy’ in 
Australian Feminist Studies 2:5 (1987), 35–55.
13 Boddy, ‘Gender Crusades’, 53; Gosselin, ‘Feminism, Anthropology and the Politics of 
Excision in Mali’, 43–60.
14 Gosselin, ‘Feminism, Anthropology and the Politics of Excision in Mali’, 48.
15 Ibid.
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‘civilized’ has long served to legitimate imperialist action and colonial rule. A 
common understanding of progress, development and social evolution under-
girds both periods of anti-FGC discourse whereby ‘traditional practices’ clearly 
fall in the domain of uncivilized.16 This ontological-epistemological background 
enabled Western activists to assume as self-evident that first ‘we’ can know17 
(what the practice is or means) and secondly that as a consequence of ‘our’ 
determination of the practice’s barbarity, there is a natural right to intervene 
(either morally or politically).18 
By raising the issue, these early activists played a crucial role in determin-
ing hegemonic discourse about FGC and raising it to the level of the negotia-
tion tables of international institutions such as the World Health Organization 
and United Nations agencies. Their tone was a fiercely rejecting one and very 
problematic for most activists coming from FGC practicing countries. Disputes in 
the late 1970s and 1980s at international meetings between African and West-
ern feminists over the ‘backwardness’ of the practice have been well charted.19 
African feminists and activists, however, have also contributed to the activist 
literature and awareness-raising against the practice. However, as Vicky Kirby 
notes, many of these works share common features and employ a similar style 
and language. She argues that ‘books about genital excision written by African 
women carry a totalizing sense of national authenticity within the role of their 
author function’.20 She compares two books by two different authors ‘almost 
identical in their medicalized arguments, research methods and bibliographi-
cal material’.21 In this respect it is worthy of note how the work of renowned 
Egyptian feminist, Nawal El Saadawi, has been received and adapted in the 
West. The English translation of her book that mentioned FGC underwent sig-
nificant changes from the Arabic original turning it into a worldwide success 
16 Boddy, ‘Gender Crusades’, 53; M. Dubois, ‘The Governance of the Third World: A 
Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in Development’ in Alternatives: Global, 
Local, Political 16:1 (1991), 1–30.
17 Kirby, ‘On the cutting edge’.
18 Njambi, ‘Irua Ria Atumia and Anti-Colonial Struggles Among the Gikuyu of Kenya’, 
693. This leads critical anthropologist Richard Shweder to castigate the global anti-FGM 
campaign by identifying it as driven by wealthy international donors, and First World 
women’s and human rights activists. He finds that ‘a discourse of horror is used that is 
similar in many ways to the missionary and colonial discourse of the 1920s’. R. Shweder, 
‘When Cultures Collide: Which Rights? Whose Tradition of Values? A Critique of the 
Global Anti-FGM Campaign’ in C.L. Eisgruber and A. Sajo (eds.), Global Justice and the 
Bulwarks of Localism, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005, 198. 
19 African participants in these meetings generally accused those from non-practicing 
countries who were speaking against the practice of cultural insensitivity. They 
rejected the argument that the practice was ‘backward’ or that it represented women’s 
subordinate position in society. See N. Berkovitch and K. Bradley, ‘The Globalization of 
Women’s Status: Consensus/Dissensus in the World Polity’ in Sociological Perspectives 
42:3 (1994), 481–498; K. Brennan, ‘The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International 
Human Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study’ in Law & Inequality 7 (1989), 
367–398; O. Koso-Thomas, The Circumcision of Women: A Strategy for Eradication, 
London: Zed Press 1987; E. Dorkenoo, Cutting the Rose: Female Genital Mutilation: The 
Practice and its Prevention, London: Minority Rights Group 1994. 
20 Kirby, ‘On the cutting edge’, 38.
21 Ibid.
Van Raemdonck: Egyptian Activism against Female Genital Cutting 
228 Religion and Gender vol. 3, no. 2 (2013), pp. 222-239
and gaining a prominent position within US academia.22 This is not to be dismis-
sive of African activist’s work, but rather to make the point that it could only be 
heard when in perceived compliance with the hegemonic discourse. However, 
the central concern here lies rather with pointing to the consequences of loca-
tion in knowledge and norm production. What stands out is the rather selective 
interest in voices from FGC practicing countries and the subsequent exclusion 
of alternative analyses and frameworks sceptical of the practice that resonate 
more with local understandings and which are not necessarily embedded within 
larger discourses of modernization and (economic) progress.
International Norm Production
After entering the international arena from the late 1970s onwards, discussion 
of FGC has seen a shift in focus from health care and health risks to a discourse of 
rights and violence against women.23 Berkovitch and Bradley discuss the debate 
prior to this period within international bodies on whether or not to tackle 
the issue. Some agencies such as World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) were initially reluctant even to study 
the practice as they considered it outside of their competence.24 The question of 
disrespecting nations’ sovereignty also prevented international institutions of 
studying or condemning the practice.25 It was only in 1979 at a WHO-sponsored 
seminar that the practices were condemned for the first time as a health haz-
ard26 and this opened the door for a broader discussion. Soon, however, the 
focus on health would give way to a rights discourse.
In the following period, the agenda of human rights expanded to include 
harm done to women by non-state, private actors. At the 1993 UN Conference 
on Human Rights in Vienna, women activists succeeded in having women’s rights 
recognized as human rights. At the same time, female genital cutting became 
classified as a form of violence against women. Berkovitch and Bradley argue 
that the link between genital mutilation and global action was enabled after 
this redefinition of the practice and of the notion of human rights within the 
world polity.27 They argue that these redefinitions were necessary to coincide 
with the global project being set up in the early 1990s, centred on modernist 
22 Saadawi’s book Al-Wajh al-’ari lil-mar’a al-’arabiyyah’ of 1977 was adapted and 
published in the US as ‘The hidden face of Eve’ in 1982. Two chapters ‘Women’s work at 
home’ and ‘The Arab woman and socialism’ were omitted and the subject of FGC was 
prioritized and expounded, while it was only mentioned briefly in the original version. 
A. Amal, ‘Framing Nawal El Saadawi: Arab Feminism in a Transnational World’ in Signs 
26:1 (2000), 215–249.
23 J. Horn, ‘Not Culture but Gender: Reconceptualizing Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting’ 
in W. Chavkin and E. Chesler (eds.), Where Human Rights Begin: Health, Sexuality and 
Women in the New Millennium, Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press 2005; E. Boyle, 
Female Genital Cutting: Cultural Conflict in the Global Community, New York: Johns 
Hopkins University Press 2002; Hernlund and Shell-Duncan (eds.), Transcultural Bodies. 
24 Berkovitch and Bradley, ‘The Globalization of Women’s Status’, 489.
25 Boyle, Female Genital Cutting.
26 Berkovitch and Bradley, ‘The Globalization of Women’s Status’, 489.
27 Ibid.
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notions of universalism, liberal individualism and rationalism. FGC became 
reconceived as an obstacle to girls’ rights and education, and thus as an obstacle 
to national progress. In this manner, opposition to FGC was now articulated as 
consistent and compatible with the liberal individualist framework. This recon-
ceptualization opened the door for global action.28
The Vienna Conference was an important preparatory meeting in the lead-up 
to the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) meet-
ing the following year (1994) which was held in Cairo. It helped make the latter 
conference into what was widely seen as a significant success and achievement 
for women’s bodily rights. The common declaration, the Cairo Programme of 
Action, that resulted from the conference clearly positioned FGC as a sexual and 
reproductive rights concern. Looking at issues such as fertility and population 
control policies through the lenses of sexual and reproductive health and rights 
was celebrated as a landmark paradigm shift in the sphere of international and 
intergovernmental institutions.29 In the aftermath of the organization of the 
ICPD, the Cairo Agreement stipulated the goal of eradicating FGC and thus 
firmly established the desirability of this eradication as a global norm in subse-
quent development discourse and practice.30
The Egyptian Task Force against FGM and the Predicament of 
Catachresis
It is against this background that I want to turn to the case of postcolonial 
Egypt. In this second part, the question is addressed how the above-described 
processes affects Egyptian activism today. What does Egyptian activism look 
like within a hegemonic anti-FGC discourse that is embedded in paradigms of 
modernization, civilization and liberal individualism? Does it rely on the same 
paradigms or does it try to move beyond them? Secondly, following from these 
questions, it is explored what it means to participate from within a postcolonial 
space in an anti-FGC campaign that is largely shaped, structured and funded 
by international institutions and private donor foundations. In short, I want to 
discuss how the politics of location operate with respect to globalized knowl-
edge production. When the history of the claim/norm to abandon the ancient 
practice of FGC has been written in the West and through consensus-building 
28 This account of the UN deliberation and assessment of FGC is geared towards the 
overall treatment of the practice across the different organizational sections, agencies 
and commissions. There are also interesting examples of culturally-sensitive treatment 
of the subject in the late 1980s. See Brennan, ‘The Influence of Cultural Relativism on 
International Human Rights Law’.
29 W. Harcourt, Body Politics in Development, Critical Debates in Gender and Development, 
London: Zed Books 2000, 42.
30 Fighting FGC is one of the components in the new UN development policy of fighting 
poverty expressed in the Millennium Development Goals of 2000. In December 2012 
the United Nations General Assembly for the first time passed a resolution against 
the practice of FGC that was widely celebrated as an important new step in the global 
campaign for eradication. See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/
PV.60 (accessed 22 July 2013).
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in international institutions, how does this predicate and complicate Egyptian 
proponents of this policy?
In what follows, I will draw on a two-month period of fieldwork in Cairo dur-
ing September to November 2012 consisting of in-depth interviews with activ-
ists and policy makers and a document analysis of campaign material and press 
reports. The aim is not to offer a comprehensive overview of achievements and 
failures of Egyptian activism and policies. Rather, the focus lies in reconstructing 
crucial junctures in the course of Egyptian activism against FGC by unravelling 
the conditions that both enabled and limited it, against the background of the 
global campaign and its hegemonic international discourse and institutions. I 
first reconstruct the founding and activities of the Egyptian national Task Force 
against FGM and its subsequent cooptation by the state. Secondly, I discuss the 
limitations and possibilities resulting from the catachrestic claim of abandoning 
FGC in postcolonial Egypt and finally I reflect on the relation between Egypt’s 
anti-FGC policy and religion.
The Creation of the Task Force and its Cooptation
The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) repre-
sents an essential juncture in both global norm-setting and in the particular 
genealogy of Egyptian activism against the practice of FGC. International public 
and political attention for FGC reached its peak during and after the confer-
ence in which the presence of female genital cutting practices in Egypt played 
a prominent role. In his address to the conference, the Egyptian Minister of 
Health stated that FGC was a dying practice in Egypt. One day later, however, 
CNN broadcast a video of the circumcision of a 13-year-old girl in Cairo. Con-
sequently, the minister was pressured to declare his intention to confront the 
practice.31 The CNN screening was received nationwide as a public scandal and 
was felt as deeply humiliating. Both the film and the conference brought Egypt 
into the international limelight which embarrassed and put the Egyptian gov-
ernment under pressure. In 1995, the first Egyptian Demographic Health Survey 
(DHS) that included data on FGC revealed that 97% of women between the 
age of 15 and 40 had undergone some form of genital cutting. The American 
Congress pushed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB) to link financial aid to reform efforts in the field of fighting FGC as early as 
1996.32 The Egyptian government started to develop highly mediatized national 
campaigns in 2000, after five years of activism from 1994 until 1999 by the 
‘National Task Force against FGM’, hereafter called the task force.
My fieldwork between September and November 2012 focused on the activi-
ties of the national task force and consisted of in-depth interviews with its for-
mer core group members. This diverse group of health and family planning 
professionals, self-described feminists, political activists and researchers became 
most identified with the cause of fighting FGC until the government started 
to develop a national policy in 2000. The topic had been earlier addressed in 
31 A. Seif el Dawla, ‘The Political and Legal Struggle over Female Genital Mutilation in 
Egypt: Five Years since the ICPD’ in Reproductive Health Matters 7:13 (1999), 128–136.
32 Boyle, Female Genital Cutting, 41.
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Egyptian public debate in several ways, most famously by feminist writer and 
activist Nawal al Saadawi in the 1970s, but it failed to become a widely discussed 
and contended topic.33 During the ICPD in 1993 it was catapulted into the public 
arena in a highly sensationalist manner due to the CNN screening. FGC suddenly 
became publicly debated in the context of other controversial subjects such as 
reproductive rights, gender justice, homosexuality and abortion. This sensation-
alist entrée led to its subsequent politicization during the course of the task 
force’s activities.34 The externally prompted, outspoken call for abandonment 
– by means of the ICPD – was answered by some conservative factions of within 
Egyptian society, stressing the cultural and religious importance of the practice.
The structure of the task force was set up immediately after the ICPD under 
the auspices of the National NGO Commission for Population and Development 
(NCPD) established in collaboration with the state to follow up on the Cairo 
Agreement, resulting from the ICPD. It was led by Aziza Hussayn, a renowned 
activist and family planning professional.35 The NCPD also hosted a task force 
on gender and another on sexual health. It was the task force against FGM, 
however, that was most active, visible and which continued working after the 
activities of the other groups dwindled. The extensive preparatory meetings 
before ICPD connected task force core members together with hundreds of 
other individuals from across the country. All my interviewees recognized the 
major impetus coming from the months-long preparations for the ICPD. This 
process created a unique moment of women group meetings, organizing and 
debating population policy, concepts of gender and women’s bodily rights and 
FGC. It was also enabled by an unusual degree of state compliance in allowing 
this remarkable flourishing of civil society.36 One interviewee pointed out, how-
ever, how quickly the state took back that freedom after the ICPD: ‘During the 
ICPD there was a relative freedom of movement that the government wanted 
to contain after the performance was over, of the conference. And that applied 
to all organizations, not only women’s organizations’.
All interviewees were highly-educated individuals concerned with women’s 
position in society, on health, reproductive rights and bodily integrity. They 
were already connected before the ICPD and the official launch of the task 
force. Its coordinator, Marie Assaad, whose activism and interest in fighting FGC 
had started in the 1950s, consciously opted to work within the NCPD frame 
because this provided her with a sense of security as a state recognized struc-
ture. Assaad emphasizes that she was fully aware of the restrictions and inse-
curities she would have faced when working within civil society or in any other 
form that could have invited adverse state attention. Both Aziza Hussayn and 
33 M. Badran, ‘Body Politic(s): Women, Power and Sexuality in Egypt’ in M. Badran, 
Feminism in Islam, Secular and Religious Convergences, London: Oneworld Publications 
2009, 168–191.
34 Seif el Dawla, ‘The Political and Legal Struggle over Female Genital Mutilation in 
Egypt’, 128; Badran, ‘Body Politic(s)’.
35 The Ford Foundation Cairo Office played a major role in providing grants for the 
NCPD and the task force and in lobbying the government to allow and establish these 
institutions to operate as intermediaries between the government and civil society. 
Letting Flowers Bloom: The Growth of Reproductive Health Efforts in Egypt, Cairo: The 
Cairo Office of the Ford Foundation, Sept. 2009, ix. 
36 Also see Boyle, Female Genital Cutting; Badran, ‘Body Politic(s)’, 174.
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Marie Assaad had been working on the issue of women’s health and against 
FGC, but never caught national attention until the ICPD brought the practice 
under international attention. The aim of the task force was to engage soci-
ety in a dialogue on the practice. It wanted to conduct research, disseminate 
information, raise awareness, train field workers and work on advocacy. Three 
committees were created, one on communication with policy makers, another 
on stimulating grassroots groups and a third one on research and study. The 
task force served as an intermediary between groups and activists based in the 
different governorates and the NCPD umbrella of ICPD follow-up institutions.37 
It followed a ‘gender equal development approach’, meaning that the practice 
identified as Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) was identified as ‘a social prob-
lem that represents violence against women and characterizes the dominance-
based relationship between both genders’.38
Dialogue and research were strongly emphasised. There were five regional 
offices across the country to build up a country-wide network. Efforts were also 
made to embed their current negative attitudes towards the practice within 
a wider historical perspective. Different booklets and studies were published 
to show earlier challenges of the practice within Egyptian society.39 Members 
engaged in research to challenge long-standing truths about the practice, 
namely that FGC was mainly practiced and maintained by women on women, 
and in areas with high illiteracy. Their research showed – in congruence with the 
Demographic Health Survey reports of the following years – that it is increas-
ingly being undertaken by doctors and medical professionals, and thus not 
by illiterate populations. Another point of focus was male attitudes towards 
the practice. One interviewee attributes these innovative approaches and new 
angles to the originality of the task force. She regrets that ‘despite this research, 
the same interventions continue the same way they did [until today], awareness 
raising among women, training of women.’
The task force’s activities were ended and the group was dissolved by its coor-
dinator, Marie Assaad after five years. In her opinion the group had reached its 
limits and the cause of fighting FGC would be better promoted when elevated 
to the level of national policy making. A new space was created for anti-FGC 
activism within the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM) 
presided by then First Lady Suzanne Mubarak, first by informal talks and then 
by the official participation of two old task force members. These experienced 
members started a process of negotiation within the NCCM to embark on a 
national-level program, namely the FGM Free Village Model, launched in 2003. 
The incorporation of the anti-FGM campaign by the NCCM opened many doors 
and provided access to state media and official state-appointed religious author-
ities. Subsequently, in the following years major changes were made, such as 
legislation that effectively criminalizes the practice in 2008 and the disapproval 
of the practice by Egypt’s highest religious authorities in 2006.
37 Toward FGM-free Villages in Egypt: A Mid-term Evaluation and Documentation of the 
FGM-Free Village Project, Cairo: Population Council 2010, 10–16.
38 N. Wassef, Da min zaman, Past and Present Discourses on FGM in Egypt, Cairo: FGM 
Task Force 1998, 4.
39 Ibid.
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Catachresis: Limitations and Possibilities for Postcolonial Anti-FGC 
Activism
Task force group members tried to connect as much as possible with Egyptian 
culture and society by dialoguing with women in different governorates and by 
emphasizing historical opposition within Egypt to the practice. They realized 
that the international campaign and the ICPD enabled much of their work by 
means of funds and moral support. This transnational link, however, also put 
them in difficult positions vis-à-vis the dominant civilizing discourse that often 
accompanied anti-FGC rhetoric. One of the interviewed members explains the 
following: 
This is one of the things that was very strange to me when I was working on 
FGM, that when you talk to the women or the men involved [at home], you are 
unconditionally against FGM. You understand why they are doing it, and you 
are trying to address the arguments why they are doing it. Then you travel to 
international conferences and you find yourself almost defending the practice of 
FGM, you know, because there is this stereotyping you know, there is this reduc-
tion of the human being to savages yeah, and it is this attitude that drives you 
to defend something that you are actually challenging at home. It is this attitude 
that makes you also understand, that makes you agree with some of the argu-
ments that your opposition inside the country is putting forward.
This activist experienced such a strong rejection of sensationalist and simplifying 
anti-FGC discourse that she heard at conferences in the 1990s, that it ironically 
almost led her to defend the practice. Civilizational discourse upsets her to the 
extent that it enables her to understand domestic proponents of the practice, 
and to mediate her feminist sensibilities. Feminist theologian Musa Dube char-
acterizes this kind of challenge of engaging in feminist postcolonial practices, 
as confronting and rejecting indigenous oppressive practices, ‘without joining 
the colonizing discourse of rejecting or demonizing every aspect of indigenous 
cultures’.40 For these practices to be simultaneously decolonizing, Dube consid-
ers they ought to ‘arrest colonizing ideology packed in claims of religious con-
version, Western civilization, modernization, development, democratization, 
and globalization’.41 On the other hand, this discussion shows the complexity of 
engaging in feminist postcolonial practices through the reclamation of certain 
political-cultural positions that fall within the legacy of ‘colonizing ideology’. 
Task force members claim the abandonment of a cultural practice because it 
harms women without wanting to adhere to the colonizing legacy and ideol-
ogy with which this position is associated, wherein we can begin to see the 
catachrestic nature of the activists’ dilemma.
While task force activism has been created and enabled to carry out its activi-
ties within the framework of international rights activism and development 
discourse, members have been limited by the same logic. One consequence of 
the development and globalization logic was the NGO-isation of the fledgling 
anti-FGC activist group. Islah Jad’s defines ‘NGO-isation’ of social and grassroots 
40 M.W. Dube, ‘Postcoloniality, Feminist Spaces and Religion’ in L. Donaldson and Kwok 
Pui-Lan (eds.), Postcolonialism, Feminism and Religious Discourse, London and New York: 
Routledge 2002, 116.
41 Ibid.
Van Raemdonck: Egyptian Activism against Female Genital Cutting 
234 Religion and Gender vol. 3, no. 2 (2013), pp. 222-239
movements as a characteristic of neoliberal reform that pressures social move-
ments into forming more structured, professionalized organizations with more 
clearly delineated activities, which mostly results in de-politicization of the 
movement.42 While the group functioned as a semi-independent movement, 
it relied heavily on foreign donor funds to conduct research and to build their 
organization and nation-wide network. One interviewee explained that this 
change was initially not expected or aimed at but was rather imposed on them 
in order to receive funds:
The FGM task force did not want to become institutionalized, or to have a struc-
ture, or to become registered. It was an informal forum, where people came to 
and paid for their transportation with their own money and the donors were so 
impressed but they wanted a structure, they wanted an institution...
She expressed uneasiness with this necessary transformation. Another mem-
ber recounts how the NGO-isation of the task force affected her personally 
and eventually led to her exclusion. The task force embraced a common vision 
against FGC (and against its medicalization) while members occasionally differed 
in opinion in matters of strategy or analysis, which was generally experienced as 
fruitful. In her case, however, her diverging opinion also clashed with funding 
donor’s expectancies. She supported the view that questioning FGC necessarily 
should go hand in hand with challenging male circumcision. Although she was 
not the only one who questioned male circumcision, she was most outspoken 
and vigorous about explaining and defending her views on bodily integrity and 
autonomy. She considers both male and female circumcision as part of gen-
der constructions which she opposes. Opposing FGC for her necessarily entails 
opposing male circumcision as well: ‘Gender is about body politics, it’s one and 
the same thing. The patriarchal society aims to create an image of masculin-
ity and femininity upon which gender roles are divided, and male and female 
circumcision are part of that’. This religiously controversial view that aims at 
abandoning both female and male genital cutting was, however, disliked by 
both Egyptian organizers of meetings to discuss FGC and by international donor 
agencies. Her deviant view gradually led to her exclusion from activities and 
ended her cooperation with the group after six years: 
The exclusion happened gradually. I was often invited to panels and meetings, 
and then questions come from the audience about MGM [Male Genital Mutila-
tion] and I would answer with the data that I know. Once, the organizers of the 
session, when I started to respond to the woman who asked [about MGM], said: 
stop, this is a session against FGM and it is financed to be against FGM and now 
you are taking minutes to speak about MGM, which is not ethical, what can we 
tell the funders? […] The stakeholders told me, ‘Ok fine, speak as you like but find 
other funders for your activity. Don’t come to our activities which are funded for 
FGM and give your information’.
Obviously much can be said about the meaning of resisting both male and 
female genital cutting within a religious conservative society and the generally 
hostile feminist reception of this idea in the period of the task force. Suffice 
to say here is that MGM is not part of the international discourse of anti-FGC 
42 I. Jad, ‘The NGO-isation of Arab Women’s Movements’ in IDS Bulletin 35 (2004), 34–42.
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funding institutions and that these propositions challenge the existing cam-
paigning framework. During the period of task force activity, individual mem-
bers were able to express their personal analysis and points of concern. The 
task force leadership or the NCPD structure did not stop them from expressing 
personal opinions. Its coordinator Assaad refers to these events by saying that 
certain members’ activities regularly ‘embarrassed’ the NCPD officials but that 
enough leeway existed that allowed regular upsetting of structures and individ-
uals.43 This situation changed after the state co-opted the task force experience 
and initiated a national policy against the practice. Members disagree about 
this final decision. While some define it as state-cooptation that should never 
have happened, arguing that the cause of fighting FGC should have remained 
within civil society, others see it as a natural and positive step forward to reach 
a national audience. The new state initiative by the National Council of Child-
hood and Motherhood headed by Suzanne Mubarak drew heavily on the exper-
tise and activism that the task force had gathered but excluded several of its 
most fervent members. One interviewee expresses it as follows:
those women who have dedicated their time and efforts to volunteer to raise the 
task force for it to have a strong position, we were never invited to the national 
conferences by the NCCM. The feminists were not invited. They rid themselves of 
the feminists, to put it bluntly ….[The task force leadership] felt that the state 
coming in would give a real push, but I disagree. I don’t believe in this, the state 
does not give a real push unless someone is pushing them, that was what the task 
force was doing. You cannot guarantee a minister who is pro[banning FGC].
The new path that was taken by old group members was one of disciplined 
and skilful negotiation and entered more the sphere of diplomacy than that of 
activism. A patient continuation of their efforts in combination with support 
from crucial state-allied personalities would eventually lead to legislation effec-
tively criminalizing FGC in 2008 and an unambiguous statement of disapproval 
of the practice by Egypt’s Islamic authorities in 2006.
Making FGC Un-Islamic
In this final section I reflect on the relation between anti-FGC activism and reli-
gion. The relationship between the task force’s anti-FGC activists and Islamic 
religious authorities has been a difficult one since the start of the ICPD prepara-
tions. More militant members soon found themselves involved in a court case 
against the head of Egypt’s highest religious authority, the sheikh of al-Azhar. 
In 1994, after the ICPD conference was held and public attention to the prac-
tice was raised, the sheikh of al-Azhar, Gad al Haq, issued a fatwa stating that 
FGC is a duty under Islam comparable to the duty of prayer. A couple of task 
force members in coalition with human rights organizations filed a suit against 
him on charges of abusing his authority to the detriment of Egyptian women.44 
While this episode represents the highest level of confrontation, the years after 
43 Interview by the Author 24 November 2012.
44 A. Abdel Hadi, ‘A Community of Women Empowered: the Story of Deir el Barsha’ in R. 
Abusharaf (ed.), Female Circumcision: Multicultural Perspectives, Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press 2006, 210.
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2000 show a more diplomatic approach as the state’s NCCM had taken charge 
and after al-Azhar had a new leader.
Dialogue with religious authorities is a well-known strategy in the interna-
tional campaign. FGC practices predate both Islam and Christianity and many 
campaigners thus target religious authorities to make clear statements about 
differentiating their religion from the cultural practice. Egyptian activism shows 
a similar focus on religious, Islamic, authorities. Progressive fatwas have been 
collected and published stating that there is no textual basis within the Islamic 
legal tradition that supports female genital cutting.45 They state that the prac-
tice cannot be considered an obligatory or an honourable act due to a lack of 
authentic textual bases within Islamic tradition. Yet this conclusion allows for an 
interpretation that the practice is permissible, that it is not forbidden by Islam.
The efforts for convincing religious authorities to throw their support behind 
the campaign culminated in 2006. This international conference on Islam 
and FGC initiated by the German NGO Target and held at al-Azhar University 
brought together an unlikely alliance of major governmental representatives, 
a German non-governmental organization, Target, Islamic clerics including the 
grand mufti and sheikh of al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi, international 
Sunni Islamic authority sheikh Yusuf al Qaradawi and representatives of the 
National Council of Childhood and Motherhood, among whom were two previ-
ous members of the task force. The conference’s final declaration, supported 
by grand mufti Ali al Gom’a, the head of Dar al Iftaa, the House of Fatwa Issu-
ance, strongly condemned the practice as harmful and therefore forbidden by 
Islam. Furthermore, it ‘urges regional and international organizations to exert 
efforts towards educating people and disseminating awareness of the health 
risks involved in this harmful practice’, it ‘calls on legislative institutions to enact 
a law prohibiting female circumcision and penalizing the perpetrator’ and ‘calls 
on international organizations and associations to provide all forms of assis-
tance to the regions where female circumcision is practiced with a view to elimi-
nating it’. 46
The language that is deployed in the final declaration strongly resonates with 
international anti-FGC campaigning discourse as it is used by the international 
community of campaigners. It explicitly invites regional and international orga-
nizations to educate and to provide assistance to Egypt. The importance of this 
declaration is that its discourse was also endorsed by Islamic religious authori-
ties, and this is considered a major success by campaigning partners, the NCCM 
and Target Group NGO. In this manner, the Egyptian national campaign against 
FGC completely intertwines with the structure and discourse provided by inter-
national institutions. The state – by means of the National Council of Mother-
hood and Childhood – proved itself to be a loyal and successful supporter of 
45 Different Egyptian fatwa concerning FGC have been issued since 1904 that concluded 
that Islamic legal tradition does not support FGC. S. Al – Awa, ‘FGM in the context of 
Islam’, Cairo: National Council for Childhood and Motherhood, undated.  http://www.
nccm-egypt.org/e9/e1869/e2357/e2358/infoboxContent2359/FGMintheContextofIslam.
pdf (accessed 22 July 2013). 
46 The declaration can be found online on the website of Target Group: http://www.
target-human-rights.com/HP-08_fatwa/index.php?p=fatwaAzhar (accessed 22 July 2013).
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the international campaign by recruiting these religious voices to the cause. It 
successfully made FGC un-Islamic, at least on a nominal, institutional level.
It is remarkable that both activists, the state and the international campaign 
place emphasis on the importance of religious leadership and their authorita-
tive voices. Their prominent position does resonate with Islamic legal and dis-
cursive tradition. At the same time, however, the understanding of religion that 
is advanced, also corresponds with secularized conceptualizations of religion, 
evident in the hegemonic international anti-FGC literature. Here, the predomi-
nant question whether FGC is Islamic or not – seemingly to be answered in a 
definite and timeless manner – attests to a static and restrictive conceptualiza-
tion of religion, emphasizing belief, tenets, legal tradition and text. It precludes 
more dynamic understandings of religion in which one’s behaviour and con-
viction is shaped by social and cultural dynamics and individual interpretation 
of Islamic tenets and ethics. For example, Richard Gauvain discusses the rejec-
tion of FGC by some salafi women based on their understanding of Islam in 
which ‘khitan [FGC] is irreconcilable with Islam’s fundamental kindness towards 
women, and, despite its appellation, should not really be described as an act of 
purification.’47 In other words, by being subsumed under a secularized under-
standing of religion as evident in international campaign discourse, the relation 
between activism and religion is generally understood as one of conflict. Thus, 
the operational assumption is that leaders ought to be convinced to declare 
that the practice is not a religious one. Another kind of relation in which reli-
gion positively figures as a basis for opposing the practice is usually not part of 
the imagery. The catachrestic tension between acceptance of hegemonic dis-
course and local appropriation and modification is then least expressed in the 
domain of religion.
Conclusion
In this paper I have explored Gayatri Spivak’s characterizations of catachresis 
within the context of Egyptian activist claims for the abandonment of the cul-
tural practice of female genital cutting (FGC). In my discussion of catachrestic 
claims I refer to conscious acts of intervention in society and the making of 
feminist political claims – namely to stop the cultural practice of female genital 
cutting. Spivak describes catachresis as the reclamation of ‘a series of regula-
tive political concepts, the supposedly authoritative narrative of whose produc-
tion was written elsewhere, in the social formation of Western Europe’.48 In this 
paper, I have argued that the international campaign against FGC is in fact of 
Western provenance and that this greatly impacts and complicates Egyptian 
activists’ work against the practice.
Sally Merry uses the term ‘vernacularization’ of rights discourses to describe 
the processes that ‘translate’ global discourses and adapt them to local institu-
tions and meanings. She discusses ‘the appropriation of women’s human rights 
47 The popular denomination of FGC is ‘tahara’, which means purification. R. Gauvain, 
Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God, London and New York: Routledge 2013, 
200–201.
48 Spivak, ‘Poststructuralism, Marginality, Postcoloniality and Value’, 225.
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to analyze the process by which human rights are remade in the vernacular’ and 
develops an ethnography of actual practices of human rights.49 Similarly, Homi 
Bhabha’s notion of hybridity as ‘subversive mimicry’ also bears on the complexi-
ties of postcolonial activism and its transformation of colonial conceptualiza-
tions. While I am also interested in the act of mediation and transformation of 
discourse originating in the transnational and the global into an Egyptian con-
text, my main concern, however, has been less on its translation itself than on 
outlining its conditions of possibility, the structures and limits that are formed 
and the subsequent exclusion of the development of alternative epistemolo-
gies that are halted or not able to take shape. The concept of catachresis and its 
foregrounding of the question of location and power in knowledge and norm 
production enables such an analysis.
The first part of the paper traced the production of knowledge on the prac-
tice of female genital cutting within European colonial and postcolonial his-
tory. Important colonial precedents of intervention in regulating and reducing 
the practice created a discourse that is undergirded by schemes of civilization, 
modernization and progress. A few decades of inattention then passed in which 
international institutions held back from interference into what they saw as 
cultural and religious matters of nation-states. Western second-wave feminism 
broke this barrier by castigating the practice as a manifestation of global patri-
archal control over women’s bodies and calling for global action. United Nations 
institutions hesitantly discussed the practice, culminating in several condemna-
tions of the practice as a violation of women’s rights and a form of violence 
against women in the 1990s. Anti-FGC action became a global norm, couched in 
terms of modernization, universalism and liberal individualism.
Against this background, I have discussed Egyptian activism focusing on the 
group of women and men which became nationally most identified with the 
cause of fighting FGC and who formed the national ‘Task Force against FGM’ in 
1994 until its disbandment in 1999, followed by a state-cooptation of the cam-
paign. I argue that task force members creatively carved out a scope of action 
for themselves, that allowed for a diversity of both militant feminists, political 
activists and pragmatics. Its work was structurally enabled and supported by 
the international institutions which funded and shaped hegemonic campaign-
ing discourse. At the same time, members struggled with the lines set out by 
this internationalist discourse. Some activists find themselves at odds with the 
civilizing tone that was heard at international conferences. The structure of 
NGO work as opposed to a grassroots movement had the effect of streamlining 
members’ activities and speech. Another form of silencing occurred when activ-
ism against FGC was taken out of the arena of civil society and incorporated into 
state policy. Only activists with a depoliticized pragmatic stance on fighting FGC 
– and thus most aligned with hegemonic discourse – were included and coopted 
in the new national initiative presided over by the then First Lady Suzanne 
Mubarak. After state co-optation, relations between official (state-appointed) 
religious authorities and the national campaign improved and culminated in 
the strongest condemnation of the practice by Egypt’s Islamic leaders. This 
focus on persuading religious authorities is an important characteristic of the 
49 S.E. Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’ in 
American Anthropologist 108:1 (2006), 39.
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international campaign. It confirms a general secularized understanding of reli-
gion that emphasizes belief as opposed to praxis and additionally disregards the 
more complex cultural and political dynamics that shape religious experience 
and identity. What we can see, to conclude, from the activism of the anti-FGC 
taskforce is an attempt to make local claims for the abandonment of the prac-
tice that accord with Egyptian values whilst at the same time speaking to and 
within a globalized (and residually colonialist) context of anti-FGC campaign-
ing. It is this negotiation of the globalized structures with a vernacular discourse 
that tries to preserve or formulate its own heterogeneity that we could charac-
terize as a catachrestic exercise in postcolonial resistance.
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